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Abstract
During World War I (1914{1918) the birth rates of countries such as France,
Germany, the U.K., Belgium and Italy declined by almost 50 percent. In France,
where the population was 40 millions in 1914, the decit of births is estimated
to 1.36 millions over 4 years while military losses are estimated at 1.4 millions.
In short, the fertility decline doubled the demographic impact of the war. Why
did fertility decline so much? The conventional wisdom is that fertility fell
below its optimal level because of the absence of men gone to war. I challenge
this view using the case of France. I construct and calibrate a model of optimal
fertility choice where a household in its childbearing years during World War
I faces a partially-compensated loss of its husband's income and an increased
probability that its wife remains alone after the war. I calibrate this probability
using the casualties sustained by the French army. The model actually over-
predicts the fertility decline by 34% even though it does not feature any physical
separations of couples. It also over-predicts the increase in fertility after the
war, and generates a temporary increase in the age at birth as observed in the
French data.
Thanks to Patrick Festy for pointing out relevant data sources and sharing some of his own
data. Thanks to John Knowles, Juan Carrillo and Cezar Santos for useful comments. All errors are
mine.
Department of Economics, KAP 316A, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA,
90089. Email: vandenbr@usc.edu.
1 Introduction
The First World War (WWI) lasted four years, from 1914 to 1918, and ravaged
European countries to an extent that had never been seen until then. During the war,
the birth rates of countries such as France, Germany, Belgium the United Kingdom
or Italy declined by about 50% {see Figure 1. In France, an estimated 1:36 million
children were not born because of this decline. This gure amounts to 3:4% of the
total French population in 1914 (40 millions), and is comparable to the military losses
which are estimated at 1:4 million men.1 In short, the fertility decline doubled the
already large demographic impact of the war.
What prompted such a decline of fertility? Answering this question will shed light on
a phenomenon that shaped the European demography for the rest of the Twentieth
century. The conventional wisdom is that during the war fertility fell below its optimal
level because of the absence of men gone to ght.2 I challenge this view using the case
of France. I develop a model of fertility choice where a household in its childbearing
years during World War I faces a partially-compensated loss of its husband's income
because of the mobilization, as well as an increased probability that its wife remains
alone after the war. Calibrating this probability as the ratio of military losses to the
number of men mobilized, and using income data to calibrate a husband's income
loss, the model actually over-predicts the fertility decline by 34% even though it does
not feature any physical separations of couples. The model also over-predicts the
post-war fertility increase and generates, as observed in the data, a temporary rise in
1See Huber (1931, p. 413). Military losses include people killed and missing in action. They are
a lower bound on the death toll of the war since they do not include civilian losses.
2See, for example Huber (1931), Vincent (1946) and Festy (1984).
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the age at birth after the war due to the postponement of fertility by the generations
aected by the war.
The unit of analysis is a nitely-lived household which, at age 1, comprises two
adults: a husband and a wife. A household derives utility from consumption per
(adult-equivalent) member and the number of children it gives birth to as well as
from the number of adults. It can choose to have children at age 1 (20-25 in the
data) and 2 (25-30 in the data), but children are costly. They require time, goods,
and a share consumption for an exogenously given number periods (childhood). A
husband supplies his time inelastically to the market in exchange for a wage, while a
wife splits her time between the market, where she faces a lower wage than a husband,
and raising children. The number of adults, from age 2 onward, follows one of two
possible regimes. In peacetime it remains 2. During a War it can decrease to 1: there
is a probability that a wife remains alone (possibly with children) once peace returns.
The quantitative strategy is the following. First, I calibrate the model's parameters to
t the time series of the French fertility rate from 1800 to the eve of World War I. That
is, I consider generations who entered their fertile years before the war broke out, so
I assume that the risk that a wife remains alone is zero. Second, using the calibrated
parameters I compute the optimal choice of the generations exposed to the war, i.e.,
generations facing a partially-compensated loss of income due to the mobilization
of men, and a non-zero probability that their wives remain alone at the end of the
war. I assume that the war is unanticipated. There are a few noteworthy results.
First, the war induces a household to save more and consume less than it would have
otherwise, thereby raising the marginal utility of its consumption. This results from
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(i) the increased uncertainty due to the war; (ii) the reduction of expected income due
to the possibility that the wife remains alone and; (iii) the loss of contemporaneous
income due to the mobilization. The increase in the marginal utility of consumption
raises the cost of diverting resources away from consumption and toward raising
children. This eect is magnied by the fact that the expected marginal benet of a
child is lower when the expected number of adults in the household decreases. Thus,
the rst consequence of the war is an instantaneous reduction of fertility, even though
the model does not feature a physical separation hindering a household's ability to
have children. Second, the war induces an age-1 household to postpone giving birth.
The reason is as follows. Children born to an age-2 household are usually more
expensive because the opportunity cost of a child increases with the wage throughout
a household's life. But this cost is partly oset by the fact when a household who
was young during the war gives birth after the war it faces no more risk. Thus, a
household can trade-o risk for a higher cost of raising children. This inter temporal
reallocation of births implies an increase in the age at birth that is consistent with
the French data.
This paper contributes to an already large literature focusing on the determinants of
fertility across countries and over time. Seminal work was done by Barro and Becker
(1988) and Barro and Becker (1989). Galor and Neil (2000) analyze the \-shaped
pattern of fertility over the long-run. Greenwood et al. (2005) propose of theory of
the baby boom in the United States. Jones et al. (2008) review alternative theories
explaining the negative relationship between income and fertility across countries and
over time. The eect of a war on fertility is explored, in the case of World War II and
the U.S. baby boom, by Doepke et al. (2007). Albanesi and Olivetti (2010) evaluate
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the eects of technological improvements in maternal health. Jones and Schoonbroodt
(2011) theorize endogenous fertility cycles. Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) ask why do
fertility rates vary so much across countries? Bar and Leukhina (2010) investigate,
simultaneously, the demographic transition and the industrial revolution. Also related
is the work by Ohanian and McGrattan (2008): an example where economic theory
is used to investigate the eect of a war. In this case the authors evaluate the eect
of the scal shock that World War II represented for the U.S. economy. Finally,
Abramitzky et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of World War I on assortative matching
in the marriage market in France. Sommer (2009) shows that in the U.S. since the
1960s, the age at birth is increasing in the degree of labor market risk.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section I present facts relative to the
number of births and deaths during the war as well as to the composition of the Army.
I argue that, although the mobilization was large, even mobilized men might have
had the opportunity to have children. I also discuss relevant facts pertaining to the
marriage market and the situation of women during the war. In Section 3 I develop
the model and discuss the determinants of optimal fertility and, in particular, the
mechanisms through which the war changes fertility. Section 4 presents the quanti-
tative analysis of the model that is rst the calibration strategy, second the results
of the main experiment, third the results of counterfactual experiments decomposing
the eects of the two shocks representing the war and, nally, a set of experiments to
evaluate the sensitivity of the main results to the choice of some parameters. Section
5 concludes.
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2 Facts
Some data are from the French census. The last census before the war was in 1911.
The rst census in the post-war era was in 1921. A census was scheduled in 1916 but
was cancelled. This data, and the data from previous censuses, were systematically
organized in the 1980s and made available from the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). It is also available from the French National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee). Vital statistics are available
during the war years for the 77 regions (departements) not occupied by the Germans.
There was a total of 87 regions in France at the beginning of the war. Huber (1931)
provides a wealth of data on the french population before, during and after the war.
It also contains a useful set of income-related data.
2.1 Births and Deaths
The demographic impact of World War I in France was large and persistent. Consider
Figure 2, which shows the age and sex structure of the population before the war, in
1910, and after the war, in 1930, 1950 and 1970. The dierences between the pre-
and post-war population structures are quite noticeable. The rst eects of the war
are visible in the 1930 panel. First, there is a decit of men (relative to women) in
the 30-50 age group. These are the men that fought during World War I and died.
Second, there is a decit of men and women in the teens. This is the generation that
should have been born during the war but was not because of the fertility decline.
The 1950 panel shows again the same phenomenon 20 years later. The men who died
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at war should have been in the 50-70 age group, and the generation not born during
the war should have been in its thirties. Note also the decit of births that occurred
in the early 1940s, that is during World War II. What caused this? It could have been
that, as during World War I, individuals had less children because of World War II.
For the French, however, the impact of World War II was quite dierent than that of
World War I, possibly because the ghting did not last as long. In fact, the birth rate
in the 1940s shows a noticeable increase.3 Thus, births were low in the 1940s because
the generation that should have been in its childbearing period, say people of age 25
in 1940, should have been born in 1915, that is in the midst of World War I. This
generation was unusually small, so it gave birth to unusually little children despite
a high birth rate. So, the decit of births during World War I lead, mechanically,
to another decit in births 25 years later not because of a reduction in fertility, but
because of a reduction in the size of the fertile population. The 1970 panel shows
that, as late as in the seventies, the demographic impact of World War I is still quite
noticeable. The generation that should have been born during the war should, by
then, have reached its fties.
The rst month of World War I was August 1914, but the rst severe reduction in
the number of live births occurred nine months later: it dropped from 46,450 in April
1915 to 29,042 in May {a 37% decline.4 During the course of the war the minimum
was attained in November 1915 when 21,047 live births were registered. The pre-
war level of births was reached again in December 1919. To put these numbers in
perspective consider Figure 3, which shows the number of births per month in France
3One can argue that the baby boom was already under way in the early 1940s in France. Green-
wood et al. (2005) propose of theory of the baby boom based on technical progress in the household.
4See Bunle (1954, Table XI, p. 309).
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and Germany from January 1906 until December 1921. The trend lines provide an
estimation of the number of births that would have realized if during the war the
trends that prevailed from 1906 to 1914 had remained. For France, the dierence
between the actual number of births and the trend, summed between May 1915 (9
months after the declaration of war) and August 1919 (9 months after the armistice),
yields an estimated 1.36 million children not born. This gure amounts to 3.4% of the
French population in 1914 (40 million) and is comparable to the total death toll of the
war for the French: 1.4 million.5 The estimate for Germany is 3.18 million children
not born. It amounts to 4.8% of the German population in 1911 (65 million) and
exceeds the number of military deaths estimated at 2 million.6 In short, the fertility
reduction that occurred during World War I doubled the demographic impact of
the war. Similar calculations, made by demographers, lead to comparable gures:
Vincent (1946) reports a decit of 1.6 million French births because of the war and
Festy (1984) reports 1.4 million.
Was the decit of birth during the war compensated by excess fertility after the war?
To answer such question is dicult in the absence of a model of the trend in the
number of births before and after the war. Vincent (1946) argues that only half of
the decit was made up for in the decade following the war. But, whether the size of
the French population was durably aected or not by the war is a separate question
from whether its age structure was. The answer to the latter question is a denite
yes.
It is interesting to compare the fertility reduction of the war to the so-called Baby
5See Huber (1931, p. 413).
6See Huber (1931, pp. 7 and 449).
8
Boom. The drop in the birth rate between before the war (1913) and the trough
(1916) is 50% over 3 years. The Baby Boom started in 1941, when the birth rate was
13.1 and peaked in 1947 at 21.3. The dierence between the two gures is a 62%
increase over 6 years. By this measure the eect of World War I, on impact, is quite
large relative to that of the Baby Boom. Yet, the Baby Boom lasted longer than
World War I and, therefore, its nal eect on the French population is larger.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the case of France was not unique. This already
transpired in Figures 1 and 3. Figure 4 shows, in addition, the age and sex structure
of the populations of Germany, Belgium, Italy as well as Europe as a whole and the
United States in 1950. All European countries exhibit a decit of births during the
war which, as is the case for France, is still noticeable in the 1950 population. The
United States, on the contrary, were not noticeably aected by the war. The United
Kingdom appears to have experienced a reduced decit of births during World War
I compared with other European countries. Europe as a whole exhibits a noticeable
decit.
2.2 The Army
The mobilization was massive. A total of 8.5 million men served in the French army
over the course of the war, while the size of the 20-50 male population is estimated
at 8.7 million on January 1st 1914. On August 1st 1914, the day of the mobilization,
the army counted already 1 million men. The remaining 7.5 million were called to
serve throughout the four years of the war.7
7See Huber (1931, p. 89).
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Not all the men serving in the army were sent to the front. On July 1st, 1915, there
were 5 million men in the army but 2.3 million of them served in the rear. These
men were serving in factories, public administrations and in the elds to help with
the production of food for the troops and the population.8 Between August 1914 and
November 1918, the fraction of men in the army actually serving in the rear remained
between 30 and 50%. The men in the rear were in touch with the civilian population
and, therefore, were more likely to have the opportunities to procreate than the men
at the front.
The combat troops did not spent all their time at the front either. Leaves from the
front were generalized in June 1915. Starting in October 1916 soldiers at the front
were granted 7 days of leave every 4 months, not including the time needed to travel
back to their families. These leaves could also be augmented at the discretion of one's
superior ocer. These leaves augmented the physical opportunities to have children.
2.3 Women
Figure 5 shows evidence that the women reaching their childbearing years during
World War I postponed their childbearing decisions. This observation is important
to understand the behavior of fertility after the war. Fertility was above trend in the
immediate aftermath of the war because the generation that should have given birth
during the war years did so after, together with the young post-war generation. In
the model of Section 3 households are allowed to chose how many children to have in
2 periods of their lives to allow this mechanism to operate and assess its importance
8See Huber (1931, p. 105).
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for the post-war recovery of fertility.
Henry (1966) shows that the marriage market was noticeably perturbed for the gen-
erations reaching their marriage and childbearing years during World War I. Women
born in 1891-1895 (aged 21 in 1914) either got married before the war or after the war.
In the latter case, that is just after the war, the marriage rate of this generation was
abnormally high relative to the marriage rates of other generations at the same age:
a sign of \recuperation" of postponed marriages. A similar result holds true for the
generation of women born in 1896-1900. By some metric, however, the perturbation
of the marriage market due to World War I was \short-lived." Henry (1966) reports
that the proportion of single women, at the age of 50 for the 1891-1895 generation
is 12.5% and for the 1896-1900 generation it is 11.9%. These gures compare with
similar gures for generations whose marriage decisions were not aected by the war
such as the 1851-1855 generation: 11.2% or the 1856-1860 generation: 11.3%. Henry
(1966) concludes that the replacement of the men killed during the war was done
through immigration and excess marriage rates for men who did not disappear dur-
ing the war years. At this stage, two observations are worth making. First, although
ex-post (that is at the age of 50) the women from the 1891-1895 and 1896-1900 gen-
erations achieved the same marriage rate as the women from other generations, from
the perspective of 1914, when they had to decide whether to get married and have
children, the probability of keeping (or replacing) a husband must have appeared
quite dierent to them than to the previous generations at the same age. Second,
the disruption in the marriage market does not imply that births should be aected.
Although it is common, it is not necessary to be married to have children. Figure
6 shows that the proportion of out-of-wedlock births increased signicantly during
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the war. Thus it seems reasonable, as a rst approximation, to study fertility choices
while abstracting from the marriage market.
Little information is available on female labor during the war. There was no exhaus-
tive census available. Some were planned during the course of the war but ended
up being cancelled. Robert (2005) reports that the best information available is
from seven surveys conducted by work inspectors. These surveys did not cover all
branches of the economy such as railways and state-owned rms. However, data are
available for 40,000 to 50,000 establishments in food, chemicals, textile, book produc-
tion, clothing, leather, wood, building, metalwork, transport and commerce. These
establishments employed about 1.5 million workers before the war: about a quarter
of the labor force in industry and commerce. Robert (2005, Table 9.1) reports the
total number employed and the number of women employed in the establishments
surveyed. Although this is not the participation rate per se it gives a picture of fe-
male labor during the war. The share of women worker was 30% in July 1914 and
peaked in January 1915 at 38.2%. It then declined slowly throughout the war and
during the following years. It was 32% in July 1920. Downs (1995) and Schweitzer
(2002) emphasize that the increase in women's participation during the war is mod-
erated by the fact that most, that is between 80 and 95 percent, of the women who
worked during the war also worked in more feminized sectors before the war. Downs
(1995, page 48) writes
In the popular imagination, working women had stepped from domes-
tic obscurity to the center of production, and into the most traditionally
male of industries. In truth, the war brought thousands of women from the
12
obscurity of ill-paid and ill-regulated works as domestic servant, weavers
and dressmakers into the brief limelight of weapons production.
In the model of Section 3 a woman's labor is exogenous which, in light of the evidence
just presented, is a reasonable abstraction.
2.4 Similar Episodes
Caldwell (2004) presents evidence of fertility decline for a list of thirteen social crises
among which the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the American Civil War,
World War I, etc... For each episode he reports signicant reductions in fertility {see
Table 1. He also reports that when fertility was already experiencing a declining
trend, the reductions observed during the periods of unrest are signicantly more
pronounced than before and after. For example, the Spanish birth rate fell as much
during the Civil War (1935-42) than during the 35 years before. These observations
suggest that episodes of great uncertainty matter for fertility choices, even when
individuals may not be physically separated.
3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
Time is discrete. There are periods of peace and one unanticipated war that lasts for
a single period. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals
living for I + J periods: I as a child and J as an adult. When an individual becomes
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adult it leaves the household in which it was born, and pairs with another adult of
the same age and the opposite sex to form a new household of age 1. The household
formation process is exogenous. Only households make decisions.
Let mj 2 f1; 2g denote the number of adult(s) in an age-j household. It is an
exogenous random variable described by a Markov chain with transition 
(m0jm) = Prob(fmj+1 = m0gjfmj = mg);
and initial condition m1 = 2: The transition function  depends on whether the
economy experiences peace or war:  2 fpeace; warg. During peacetime the number
of adults is constant:
peace(m0jm) = I(fm0 = mg):
During the war there is a non-zero probability that a wife remains alone after peace
returns:
war(1j2) > 0:
The exact value of war(1j2) is determined in Section 4.2. Since households are formed
with two members and remain as such during peacetime there are no one-adult house-
holds when the war breaks out. Thus, the transition war(j1) does not need to be
specied. One can interpret war(1j2) as the probability that a husband dies during
the war and his wife does not remarry. Therefore, the probability war(2j2) is either
that of a husband surviving the war or dying but his wife re-marrying. Note that the
transition function war is independent of age. This assumption is motivated by the
fact that men from a large range of ages were mobilized.
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A household is fecund twice during its life, at age 1 and 2. That is, it chooses how
many children to give birth to only at age 1 and 2, and only if there are two adults.
The number of children born to an age-1 household is denoted b1. They remain
present until the household reaches age I. The number of children born to an age-2
household is denoted b2. They remain until it reaches age I+1. The stock of children
present in an age-j household, denoted by nj, is
nj = b1If1  j  Ig+ b2If2  j  I + 1g: (1)
A household's preferences are represented by
E1
(
JX
j=1
j 1

U

cj
(nj;mj)

+ V (nj;mj)
)
where E1 is the expectation operator, conditional on information available at age
1. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, cj is total household
consumption at age j and (n;m) is an adult-equivalent scale. The parameter  is
positive, and
U(x) =
x1 
1   and V (n;m) = (n
 +m)1=
with  > 0 and   1.
At this stage a few observations are in order. First, a household values consumption
per (adult equivalent) member and not total consumption. Thus, one of the costs of
having a child is a reduction of consumption per (adult equivalent) member. Note also
that the introduction of the adult-equivalent scale aects the way the marginal cost
of a child changes when the number of adult decreases. To understand this remember
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that the marginal utility of consumption measures the cost of diverting resources
away from consumption and into childrearing. Suppose now that an adult disappears.
Then, total consumption decreases and if a household valued total consumption the
marginal cost of a child would increase by a magnitude dictated by the slope of U .
Since instead a household values consumption per (adult equivalent) member, this
eect is mitigated by the fact that the decrease of total consumption together with a
decrease of the number of adults implies less of a reduction of the consumption per
(adult equivalent) member and, therefore, less of an increase in the marginal cost of
a child. Second, children of the same age (born in the same period) and of dierent
age (born in dierent periods) are perfect substitutes in utility. This assumption is
made for simplicity. Third, the degree of substitutability between children and adults
depends on , the value of which is disciplined by data in the quantitative exercise
of Section 4. When  = 1 children and adults are perfect substitutes. As  decreases
children and adults become more complementary. In the limit, as !  1, children
and adults are perfect complement. The value of  is important for the eect of an
exogenous shock to the number of adults, m, on fertility. If children and adults are
perfect substitute, a decrease of the number of adults can be compensated by an
increase in fertility, holding everything else constant. If, however, children and adults
are complement, a decrease of the number of adults implies a reduction of the optimal
number of children. Fourth, the number of adults acts as a preference shock through
two channels: (i) a decrease of the number of adults directly aects utility and, in
particular, it reduces the marginal utility of children through V ; (ii) a decrease of the
number of adults implies an increase in consumption per (adult equivalent) member,
holding everything else constant. Beside the eect of m on preferences, a decrease of
16
the number of adults also acts as an income shock. This is described in what follows.
Adults are endowed with one unit of productive time per period. A husband supplies
his time inelastically while a wife allocates hers between raising children and working.
A child requires  units of a wife's time and e units of the consumption good for each
period during which it is present in the household. The parameter  represents the
state of the \childrearing" technology and, therefore, is not a control variable. Thus,
a wife's time allocation is indirectly controlled through the number of children she
gives birth to. The wage rate for a husband is denoted by wm and is assumed to
grow at the constant (gross) rate g > 1 per period. The wage rate for a wife is
denoted wf and is assumed to grow at rate g too. Let w denote the vector of wages:
w =
 
wm; wf

: It is convenient to dene the function
L(w;m) =
8><>: w
m + wf when m = 2
wf when m = 1
as the \potential" labor income of a household, i.e., the labor income it would receive
if no time was devoted to raising children. The actual labor income of a household
with m adults, n children and facing wages w is then L(w;m)  wfn: A household
has access to a one-period, risk-free bond with (gross) rate of interest 1=. It can
freely borrow and lend any amount at this rate. It owns no assets at the beginning
of age 1.
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3.2 Optimization
Let s = (w; ) describe the aggregate state of the economy, that is the vector of wages
as well as the transition function for m. At the beginning of age 1 a household is
made of 2 adults. It has no assets and no children. It decides to consume (c) save
(a0) and how many children to give birth to (b1). Its value function when facing the
state s is
W1 (s) = max
c;b1;a0
U

c
(b1; 2)

+ V (b1; 2) + 
X
m0=1;2
W2 (a
0;m0; b1; s0) (m0j2) (2)
subject to
c+ a0 + b1
 
e+ wf

= L(w; 2) (3)
and
s0 =
 
(gwm; gwf ); peace

: (4)
The right-hand side of the budget constraint (3) shows the \potential" labor income
of a household. The time cost of raising b1 children appears as an expenditure on
the left-hand side: wfb1. Thus, the eective labor income is, as discussed earlier,
wm+wf (1  b1). The function W2 (a0;m0; b1; s0) is the value function of a household
of age 2 with a0 assets accumulated, b1 children born at age 1, m0 surviving adults,
and facing the aggregate state s0. Note that at age 1 the number of children born and
the number of children present in the household are the same since n1 = b1, as per
Equation (1). Note, nally, that b1 is a relevant state variable for an age 2 household
whenever I  2 as assumed here.
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Equation (4) is the law of motion for the aggregate state. A few points are worth
mentioning. First, a household anticipates wages to grow at the constant rate g.
Second it expects peace to prevail in the next period. This assumption is made for
simplicity. It implies that the war is unanticipated since during peacetime a household
expects the next period to be one of peace too. It also implies that once the war breaks
out, a household expects it to be over by the end of the period.
At the beginning of age 2 a household learns its number of adults, m, and decides to
consume (c) save (a0) and how many children to give birth to (b2). The optimization
problem writes
W2 (a;m; b1; s) = max
c;b2;a0
U

c
(b1 + b2;m)

+ V (b1 + b2;m)
+ 
X
m0=1;2
W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2; s0)(m0jm) (5)
subject to
c+ a0 + (b1 + b2)
 
e+ wf

= L(w;m) +
a

(6)
s0 =
 
(gwm; gwf ); peace

and the solution for b2 is zero whenever m = 1. The right-hand side of the budget
constraint represents total income: the sum of \potential" labor income as well as
income from assets accumulated during the previous period. The time cost of raising
the children present in the household at age 2 appears as an expenditure on the left-
hand side. As per Equation (1) the number of children present in the household at
age 2 is n2 = b1 + b2. The function W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2; s0) is the value function of an
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age 3 household with a0 assets accumulated, m0 adults, b1 children born at age 1, b2
children born at age 2 and facing the state s0. Note that, even though there are no
births after age 2, the household must keep track of the number of children born at
age 1 and 2 in order to assess the childrearing cost it is facing each period, as well as
to compute its (adult equivalent) size.
From age 3 onward the only choices are consumption (c) and savings (a0). The
number of children, nj, evolves in line with the law of motion described by Equation
(1). Formally, the optimization problem writes
Wj(a;m; b1; b2; s) = max
c;a0
U

c
(n;m)

+ V (n;m)
+ 
X
m0=1;2
Wj+1(a
0;m0; b1; b2; s0)(m0jm) (7)
subject to
c+ a0 + n
 
e+ wf

= L(w;m) +
a

(8)
s0 =
 
(gwm; gwf ); peace

n : given by Equation (1)
j > 2
and a0 = 0 when j = J .
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3.2.1 Optimality Conditions
The rst order conditions for consumption and savings at age 1 imply the Euler
equation:
U 0

c
(b1; 2)

1
(b1; 2)
= 
X
m0=1;2
@
@a0
W2(a
0;m0; b1; s0)(m0j2): (9)
Note that the marginal cost of a reduction in household consumption, measured on the
left-hand side, is the marginal utility of consumption per (adult equivalent) member.
The marginal benet is the expected marginal gain at age 2, measured on the right-
hand side of the equation. The rst order condition for consumption and fertility can
be rearranged into

@
@b1
V (b1; 2) + 
X
m0=1;2
@
@b1
W2(a
0;m0; b1; s0)(m0j2) =
U 0

c
(b1; 2)

1
(b1; 2)

e+ wf +
c
(b1; 2)
@
@b1
1(b1; 2)

(10)
where the left-hand side is the marginal benet of a child born at age 1, and the
right-hand side is the marginal cost. The marginal benet comprises two parts:
the instantaneous benet at age 1, measured by @V (b1; 2)=@b1, and the expected
marginal benet from age 2 onward measured by 
P
m0=1;2 @W2(a
0;m0; b1; s0)=@b1 
(m0j2). The marginal cost comprises three elements. The rst two are the resource
cost of raising the child, e, and the time cost, i.e., the loss of a fraction of the
wife's labor income, wf . The third element is the allocation of consumption to
the newborn. The new child represents an increase of @(b1; 2)=@b1 adult-equivalent,
21
thus it receives c=(b1; 2)  @(b1; 2)=@b1 units of consumption. These three costs,
expressed in consumption units, are weighted by the marginal utility of consumption
per (adult equivalent) member, U 0(c=(b1; 2))=(b1; 2).
There are two mechanisms through which the war aects fertility, the second magni-
fying the eect of the rst. First, the expected marginal benet of a child (left-hand
side of 10) decreases during the war. This is because the war implies a reduction of
the expected number of adults from 2 to 2  (1j2); and because the marginal utility
of a child is increasing in the number of adults: Vnm > 0. The second reason why the
war reduces optimal fertility is because it also implies an increase of the marginal cost
of raising a child. This increase occurs because consumption decreases during the war
and, therefore, its marginal utility increases, i.e. the cost of diverting resources away
from consumption and toward raising a child increases. The decrease in consumption
is the result of three separate causes: (i) a contemporaneous loss of income due to
the mobilization of the husband, i.e. a temporary decrease of wm; (ii) an increase
in savings due to the decrease in future expected income, i.e. an expected reduction
in the number of adults; and (iii) an increase in savings due to increased risk with
respect to m.
At age 2 the Euler Equation and optimality condition for fertility are:
U 0

c
(b1 + b2;m)

1
(b1 + b2;m)
= 
X
m0=1;2
@
@a0
W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2; s0)(m0jm) (11)
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and

@
@b2
V (b1 + b2;m) + 
X
m0=1;2
@
@b2
W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2; s0)(m0jm) =
U 0

c
(b1 + b2;m)

1
(b1 + b2;m)

e+ wf +
c
(b1 + b2;m)
@
@b2
(b1 + b2;m)

(12)
which have the same interpretations as Equations (9) and (10). When m = 1 a
household cannot have children, therefore b2 = 0 and Equation (12) does not hold
with equality.
At age 3 and above the only choice faced by a household is that of consumption and
savings. The optimality conditions for consumption and savings are then summarized
by the Euler equation
U

c
(n;m)

1
(n;m)
= 
X
m0=1;2
@
@a0
Wj+1(a
0;m0; b1; b2; s0)(m0jm):
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model to t the time series of the French fertility rate
from 1800 until the eve of World War I. Using the calibrated parameters I conduct
a set of three experiments where I compute the optimal decisions of the generations
reaching their childbearing years during the war and after. In the rst experiment,
which I refer to as the \baseline," the generations reaching their childbearing years
during the war experience two shocks that their predecessors did not: a higher risk
that a wife remains alone in the household after the end of the war, and a partially-
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compensated loss of a husband's income during the war. This experiment provides a
quantitative assessment of the eect of the war on optimal fertility. Then, I conduct
two counterfactual experiments to decompose the contribution of the shocks. In the
rst, I report the optimal fertility implied by the model when abstracting from the
income loss during the war while maintaining the increased risk that a wife remains
alone. In the second I report the results of the opposite exercise: the optimal fertility
predicted by the model when a household faces an income loss during the war, but
not the risk that a wife remains alone. Finally, I also discuss the sensitivity of the
baseline results with respect to the choice of some parameters.
4.1 Calibration
Amodel period is 5 years. Thus, an individual of age 1 in the model can be interpreted
as a child between the age of 0 and 5 in the data. Let I = 4 and J = 7 so that an
individual remains in the household in which it was born until it reaches the age of 15-
20, and a young household is composed of two individuals between the age of 20 and
25. Households in the model have their children during the rst and second period of
their adult lives, which correspond to their 20s in the data. Life ends between the age
of 50 and 55. An optimal path of fertility is a vector of 26 observations corresponding
the the calendar years 1806; 1811; : : : ; 1931:
Let the rate of interest on the risk free asset be 4 percent per year. This implies a
subjective discount factor  = 1:04 5. I assume that wm and wf grow at the same,
constant (gross) rate g from some initial conditions. I use the rate of growth of the
Gross National Product per capita, 1:6 percent per year, to calibrate g {see Carre et
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al. (1976, Tables 1.1 and 2.3). Thus, g = 1:0165. I normalize the initial condition
(corresponding to 1806 in the data) for wm to 1 and I assume a constant gender gap in
wages wf=wm. Huber (1931, pp. 932-935) reports gures for the daily wages for men
and women in agriculture, industry and commerce in 1913. In industry, a woman's
wage in 1913 was 52% of a man's. In agriculture the gap was 64%, and in commerce
it was 77%. Since commerce was noticeably smaller than agriculture and industry I
use wf=wm = 0:6. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to wf=wm.
Note that a gender gap in earnings of 60% is consistent with the ndings of the more
recent literature studying the United States. Blau and Kahn (2006, Figure 2.1) report
that women working full-time earned between 55% and 65% of what men earned from
the 1950s to the 1980s. Knowles (2010) reports that, throughout the 1960s, the ratio
of mean wages of women to those of men was slightly below 60% in the U.S.
For , the adult-equivalent scale, I use the \OECD-modied equivalence scale" which
assigns a value of 1 to the rst adult member in a household, 0.5 to the second adult
and 0.3 to each child:
(n;m) =
1
2
+
m
2
+ 0:3n:
In the model the war breaks out in 1916. The 1911 generation gives birth to children
in 1911 and 1916. It is then aected by the war, which I assume to be unanticipated,
only in 1916. Thus, I calibrate the remaining parameters to minimize the distance
between the fertility data up to and including 1911 and the fertility predicted by the
model, assuming that  = peace for all generations.
More specically, let  = (; ; ; )0 be the vector of remaining parameters where the
rst three elements are preference parameters and  is the time-cost of a child. They
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are chosen in order to solve the following minimization problem:
min

X
t2I
(ft()  ft)2 + (  n1911()  0:1)2 (13)
where I is an index set: I = f1806; 1811; 1816; : : : ; 1911g. This objective function
deserves a few comments. First, ft() is the fertility rate implied by the model for
a given value of . Since women in households of age 1 and 2 give births at each
date, ft() is the sum of births from these two generations at date t, divided by
2. Second, ft is the empirical counterpart of ft(). It is constructed from birth
rates from Mitchell (1998) as well as fertility data from the French National Institute
for Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee). The birth rate, that is the number of
birth per population is a dierent measure of fertility than the fertility rate which
is the number of birth per fertile women. The latter is the empirical counterpart of
the decisions of households of age 1 and 2 in the model. The French fertility rate,
unfortunately, is not available before 1900 while Mitchell's data goes back to 1800.
After splicing the two series together in 1900, however, one can verify that their
behavior is quite close on the period over which they overlap.9 Third, n1906() is the
total number of children born to the 1906 generation. Thus, the second part of the
objective function is the distance between the time spent by this generation raising
its children and its empirical counterpart, 10%. The latter gure comes from Aguiar
and Hurst (2007, Table II). They report that in the 1960s a woman in the U.S. spends
close to 6 hours per week on various aspect of childcare, that is primary, educational
and recreational. This amounts to 10% of the sum of market work, non-market work
9Data available upon request.
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and childcare (61 hours). Thus,  is set to imply that the time spent by a women
on childcare, on the eve of the war, is 10% as well. The good cost of raising a child
is assumed to be zero, i.e., e = 0. Note that if e was proportional to wf that is,
if the good cost of raising a child was growing at rate g, then setting e to 0 would
be innocuous since e could be subsumed into  . In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity
results with respect to the target gure for the time cost of raising a child.
Although , ,  and  are determined simultaneously, some aspects of the data are
more important than others for some parameters. The level of fertility, in particular,
is critical to discipline the parameter  which measures the intensity of a household's
taste for children. The time cost of a child, that is 10% of a woman's time, is critical
in determining the value of  . The parameter  determines the curvature of the
marginal utility of consumption and, since the number of adults in a household in
constant, the parameter  determines the curvature of the marginal utility of fertility.
Thus the decline in fertility which results from a comparison between its marginal
cost (partly driven by the marginal utility of consumption) and its marginal benet,
disciplines the parameters  and .
The calibrated parameters are displayed in Table 2. Figure 7 displays the computed
and actual fertility rate for the pre-war period. The model ts the data well. It
generates a downward trend in the birth rate due to the rising opportunity cost of
raising children when the wage rate increases.
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4.2 Baseline Experiment
In the model the war breaks out in 1916. It is unanticipated, and it is expected to
last for one period. Using the calibrated parameters, I compute the optimal fertility
of the households of age 1 and 2 in 1916. Unlike their predecessors, they use the
transition war to assess the risk that their wives remain alone after the war is over,
and they also face a temporary loss of their husbands' income during the war. Thus,
the aggregate state of the economy is described by
s1916 =

(1  )wm1916; wf1916

; war

:
where  is the fraction of a husband's income that is lost because of the war. The wages
wm1916 and w
f
1916 are dened by the initial conditions and rate of growth determined
in Section 4.1. An age 2 household in 1916 inherits its individual state variables from
decisions made in 1911, when it was of age 1 and used the transition function peace
to make its decisions: savings and age-1 fertility.
I calibrate war(1j2) as
war(1j2) = military losses of World War I
total men mobilized
:
The military losses where 1:4 millions while 8:5 million men were mobilized. Thus,
I use war(1j2) = 1:4=8:5 = 0:16. This gure is not perfect. On the one hand it
might exaggerate the risk from the perspective of a wife since she has the possibility
of remarrying after the war if her husband died. This possibility would allow a wife
to raise her children with hers and another husband's income. On the other hand
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the probability may underestimate the risk since the husband may survive the war
but come home disabled. In the case of World War I this was a distinct possibility
since the massive use of artillery and gases made this conict quite dierent from
any other conict before. Huber (1931, p. 448) reports 4.2 million wounded during
the war: half of the men mobilized. The number of invalid was 1.1 million among
which 130,000 were mutilated and 60,000 were amputated. In Section 4.4 I present
sensitivity results with respect to war(1j2) to address these concerns.
Households did not get fully compensated for the income loss they incurred while the
men were mobilized. Downs (1995) cites a compensation amounting to somewhere
between 35 and 60% of a man's pre-war salary in agriculture or industry.10 To rep-
resent this loss, I set  = 0:5. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect
to the magnitude of the income loss of the husband.
Figure 8 and Table 3 show the results of the experiment. The fertility rate falls by
66% in 1916 relative to 1911 in the model, versus 49% in the data. Thus the model
over-predicts the decline in fertility by 34% (66=49 = 1:34). After the war fertility
increases by 248% in the model versus 118% in the data. Thus the model over-
predicts the post-war increase by 110% (248=118 = 2:1). Figure 9 helps interpreting
these results. It shows the fertility by age at dierent point in time, as predicted by
the model. Observe that the fertility drop of the war is a combination of a decline of
fertility for both the age 1 and age 2 households. These households face an increased
risk that their wives remain alone after the war, which implies a loss of expected
income. In addition they face a reduction in their contemporaneous income. These
10See Downs (1995, p. 49) and Huber (1931, pp. 932-935).
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shocks lead them to reduce their consumption, thereby increasing the cost of raising
children. The increase of fertility after the war is a consequence of the intertemporal
reallocation of births by the 1916 generation. This generation reduces its fertility
during the war, when it is of age 1, and increases it above trend once the war is
over, when it is of age 2. So the age at birth for this generation has increased. A
fact consistent with the pattern observed in the data of gure 5. Finally the young
households of 1921, the rst post-war generation in the model, do not face the risk
and income loss faced by the 1916 generation. Hence they do not need to lower
their consumption and, therefore, they face a lower cost of raising children. So, this
generation has an age-1 fertility that is consistent with the trend that prevailed before
the war broke out.11
This exercise shows that the combination of a husband's mobilization, i.e., his inability
to earn income during the war, and the likelihood that his wife might remain alone
after the war imply large changes in optimal fertility, over-predicting both the decrease
observed during the war and the catch-up observed after. Note again that although,
in the model, husbands are unable to receive income during the war, there are no
physical separations of couples.
11Since actual fertility is below the trend predicted by the model in 1911, another way to assess the
result of the experiment is to compare deviations from trend in the data and the model. The trend
of fertility is the path implied by the model in the absence of the war. The data shows that fertility
declined 53% below its trend in 1916 while the model predicts a 65% decline. By this measure the
model over-predicts the decline in fertility by 22% (65=53 = 1:22). Similarly, the model over-predicts
the increase after the war: the data shows a 4% deviation from trend while the model predicts a
25% deviation.
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4.3 Decomposition
To evaluate the relative contributions of the shocks faced by households exposed to
the war during their fertile years, I conduct two counterfactual experiments. In the
rst, I recompute the optimal fertility path assuming that  = 0, while maintaining
war(1j2) = 1:4=8:5 = 0:16, i.e., the only shock faced by households during the war is
the change to the transition function governing the number of adults. In the second
experiment I maintain  = 0:5 while imposing war(1j2) = 0. Thus, the only shock
faced by households is a reduction of their contemporaneous income.
Figure 10 and Table 3 show the results of the experiments. When households are
faced with the same risk of loosing their husbands as in the baseline, but no contem-
poraneous income loss, the decrease of fertility is 83% of what the baseline predicted.
The post-war increase is 72% of the baseline prediction. This result suggests that the
bulk of the fertility changes caused by the war can be attributed to the increased risk,
that households faced, to see their husbands not return (or not be replaced) after the
war.
Indeed, when the only shock faced by households is the loss of income due to the
mobilization, the fertility decline is 25% of the baseline's prediction and the post-
war increase 8 percent. This result implies that if households anticipated to replace
deceased husbands for sure, then the decline in optimal fertility should have been
32% of the actual decline (16=49 = 0:32, see Table 3.)
It is not surprising that the risk that a wife remains alone plays a larger role than
the contemporaneous income loss for a household. The latter is a temporary shock
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while the former is a permanent income shock. But, in addition to being an income
shock, a reduction of the number of adults is also a preference shock, as discussed in
Section 3.1, which reduces the expected marginal benet for a child.
4.4 Sensitivity
I consider alternative values for (i) the probability that a woman remains alone after
the war, war(1j2); (ii) the magnitude of the husband's income loss during the war,
; (iii) the time cost of raising children,  ; and (iv) the gender wage gap in earnings,
wf=wm.
a - Sensitivity to war(1j2), the Risk that a Wife Remains Alone after World War I
Consider two alternative values for war(1j2), the probability that a woman remains
alone after the war. The rst is war(1j2) = 0:1 instead of 0.16 in the baseline. The
second is war(1j2) = 0:2. In both cases the baseline experiment of Section 4.2 is
performed with the new value of war(1j2). Table 4 reports the results. It transpires
that this probability matters noticeably for the results of the exercise but that, even
in the conservative case where the risk for a wife to remain alone is 10%, the model
still over-predicts the decline in fertility by 10% (v. 34% in the baseline) and the
post-war increase by 31% (v. 110% in the baseline).
b - Sensitivity to , the Income Loss of a Husband During World War I
In the experiment of Section 4.2 a household loses 50% of a husband's income because
of mobilization. I consider two alternative values: one where the loss of income is
25% and one where it is 75%. Performing the same experiment as in Section 4.2
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with these values implies results that are reported in Table 5. As the income loss
gets smaller, the model accounts for a smaller proportion of the actual decline and
post-war increase. In the case of an income loss of 25% during the war, the model
over-predicts the decline in fertility by 23% (v. 34% in the baseline). When the
income loss is 75% the model over-predicts the decline in fertility by 42%
Note that lower values of  and war(1j2) imply a smaller eect of the war than in
the baseline. A combination of these lower parameters can then deliver a model's
prediction that is close to the data. In fact, when  = 0:25 and war(1j2) = 0:1, the
model predicts a 48% drop in fertility during the war (v. 49 in the data) and a 118%
increase after the war (v. 118 in the data).
c - Sensitivity to the Time Cost of Raising a Child
Consider now alternative targets for the time cost of raising children. For each new
value the model needs to be calibrated again, in exactly the same fashion as in Section
4.1 with the exception of the target in the second component of the objective function
(13). Then the experiment of Section 4.2 is performed. I consider two alternative
targets: a time cost of 5% and a time cost of 20%. The results are displayed in Table
6. There are two observations worth making here. First, the model over-predicts
changes in fertility in both cases. Second, the model's prediction for the change in
fertility is not monotonic in the time cost of a child. It may appear \counter-intuitive"
that the eect of the war on fertility is not exacerbated when the cost of a child is
larger than in the baseline, e.g., when it is 20%. The reason for this result is that, as
the target gure for the time cost of a child changes, other parameters change too.
In particular, a larger-than-baseline time cost of raising a child implies, through the
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calibration procedure, a higher value for : This can be understood as follows: as the
opportunity cost of raising a child increases the marginal cost increases too. Since
the model is calibrated to t the data, marginal cost and marginal benet must be
equalized at the same fertility level. This implies that the marginal benet of a child
must also increase, which is achieve through higher values for  and . Higher values
for , however, imply less complementarity between adults and children in utility.
This, in turn, makes the war less costly.
Another experiment with respect to the time cost of children consists in changing 
without recalibrating the model. In this case the time series of fertility does not t
the data, but conclusions can be drawn from the change in fertility during the war. In
the case where  is divided by two relative to its baseline value, the change in fertility
during the war is 123% of the data (v. 134 in the baseline), and the increase after the
war is 162% of the data (v. 210 in the baseline). If  is set at twice its baseline value
the model accounts for 144% and 274% of the changes in fertility during and after
the war. Thus, the eect of the war is indeed increasing in the time cost of raising
a child. However, even with a time cost parameter twice as little as in the baseline
calibration the model still over-predicts the changes in fertility caused by the war.
d - Sensitivity to wf=wm, the Gender Earning Gap
In Table 7 I report the results of an exercise where I perform a sensitivity analysis
with respect to wm=wf , the gender earning gap. I consider two alternative values: 40
and 80%. As for the sensitivity analysis with respect to  , the model's paramaters are
calibrated again for each alternative value of wm=wf and the experiment of Section
4.2 is performed. The model over-predicts fertility changes in all these experiments.
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5 Conclusion
The human losses of World War I were not only on the battleeld. In France, the
number of children not born during the war was as large as military casualties (larger
in the case of Germany). The age structure of population in France and other Euro-
pean countries was signicantly changed by this event, and the eect lasted for the
entire twentieth century. In this paper I argue that this phenomenon is more than ac-
counted for by the optimal decisions of households facing two shocks: a loss of income
during the war due to the mobilization of men, and an increased risk that women
remain alone after the war. These two shocks imply that young adults during the war
see their contemporaneous and expected income decline. As a result they save more
and consume less which increases the cost of having children. The resulting drop in
fertility is 34% larger than the actual decline. The model is also able to generate
the strong catch-up of fertility after the war, mostly because of the intertemporal
reallocation of births done by the young generations during the war. The physical
separation of couples which is often cited to explain the fertility decline during the
war may have been a factor of secondary importance. This nding is consistent with
a general pattern exhibited by fertility, across countries and over time, i.e., it tends
to decline during periods of signicant unrest even though there may be no physical
separations of couples.
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Table 1: Changes in Fertility for Countries Experiencing Major Social Upheavals
Country Episode Period Change in CBR (%)
England Civil War, Commonwealth,
and early Restoration 1641-66  17:3
France Revolution 1787-1804  22:5
USA Civil War 1860-70  12:8
Russia WWI and Revolution 1913-21  24:4
Germany War, revolution, defeat, ination 1913-1924  26:1
Austria War, defeat, empire dismembered 1913-24  26:9
Spain Civil war and dictatorship 1935-42  21:4
Germany War, defeat, occupation 1938-50  17:3
Japan War, defeat, occupation 1940-55  34:0
Chile Military coup and dictatorship 1972-78  22:3
Portugal Revolution 1973-85  33:3
Spain Dictatorship to democracy 1976-85  37:2
Eastern Europe Communism to capitalism 1986-98
Russia  56:0
Poland  40:0
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic)  38:0
Source: Caldwell (2004, Table 1).
Note: CBR is Crude Birth Rate.
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Table 2: Calibration
Preferences  = 1:04 5,  = 0:62,  =  0:10,  = 0:86
Wages wm = 1; wf = 0:6 for initial (1806) generation
g = 1:0165
Cost of children  = 3:65, e = 0
Adult equivalent scale (n;m) = 1=2 +m=2 + 0:3n
Demography I = 4, J = 7
Table 3: Results
Decrease (%) Increase (%)
Data 49 118
Baseline 66 248
Baseline / Data 1.34 2.10
Experiment 1 (no income loss) 55 153
Experiment 1/Baseline 0.83 0.72
Experiment 2 (no risk) 16 20
Experiment 2/Baseline 0.24 0.08
Note: The table shows the decline in fertility between 1911 and 1916, in percentage, as well as the
increase between 1916 and 1921.
40
Table 4: Sensitivity to war(1j2), the Risk that a Wife Remains Alone in her Household
after World War I
%age of decline %age of increase
war(1j2) = 0:10 110 131
war(1j2) = 0:16 (Baseline) 134 210
war(1j2) = 0:20 142 252
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the war that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
war that is accounted for.
Table 5: Sensitivity to , the Income Loss of a Husband During World War I
%age of decline %age of increase
 = 25% 123 166
 = 50% (Baseline) 134 210
 = 75% 143 266
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the war that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
war that is accounted for.
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Table 6: Sensitivity to the Time Cost of Raising a Child
Time cost %age of decline %age of increase
5% 132 199
10% (Baseline) 134 210
20% 118 147
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the war that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
war that is accounted for.
Table 7: Sensitivity to wf=wm, the Gender Earning Gap
%age of decline %age of increase
wf=wm = 0:4 155 362
wf=wm = 0:6 (baseline) 134 210
wf=wm = 0:8 118 172
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the war that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
war that is accounted for.
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Figure 1: Birth Rates in Some European Countries
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Figure 2: French Population by Age and Sex, January 1, Selected Years
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Figure 3: Number of Births per Month in France and Germany
Note: The source of data is Bunle (1954, Table XI). The linear trends are estimated using the data
from January 1906 until July 1914. The shaded area is from May 1915, that is 9 months after the
declaration of War between France and Germany in August 1914, until August 1919 that is 9 months
after the armistice was signed in November 1918.
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Figure 4: Population by Age and Sex, Selected Countries, 1950
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Figure 5: Average and Median Age at Birth in France
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Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
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Figure 6: Proportion of Out-of-Wedlock Live Births in France
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Figure 7: Fertility Rate in France, Model and Data, 1806{1911
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Note: This gure displays the result of the calibration procedure where the model parameters are
chosen to t the time series of fertility during the pre-war period.
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Figure 8: Fertility Rate in France, Baseline Experiment and Data, 1806{1931
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Note: In the baseline experiment the generations aected by the war faces both an increased proba-
bility that their wives remain alone after the end of the war, and a temporary loss of their husbands'
income during the war.
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Figure 9: Fertility Rate Predicted by the Model by Age, Baseline Experiment, 1806{
1931
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Figure 10: Fertility Rate Predicted by the Model, Baseline and Counterfactual Ex-
periments, 1806{1931
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